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Interest Rate Pass Through and the Asymmetric Relationship between the 




There is an ongoing controversy over whether banks’ mortgage rates rise more rapidly than 
they fall due to their asymmetric responses to changes in the cash rate. This paper examines the 
dynamic interplay between the cash rate and the standard-variable mortgage rate using monthly 
data in the post–1989 era. Unlike previous Australian studies, our proposed threshold and 
asymmetric error-correction models account for both the amount and adjustment asymmetries. 
We found that the RBA’s (Reserve Bank of Australia) rate rises have a much larger and more 
instantaneous impact on the mortgage rate than rate cuts.  
JEL classification codes: C24, C58, E43 and E58. 
Keywords: Banks’ mortgage rates, Asymmetric and threshold error-correction models, Australia. 
I  Introduction 
Examining the asymmetric behaviour of banks has been an important and ongoing empirical 
issue in macroeconomics and finance since the pioneering work of Eichengreen, Watson and 
Grossman (1985) in which they analysed the Bank of England’s discount rate policy under the 
interwar gold standard (1925–31). They found that there was asymmetry in the Bank's response 
to reserve gains and losses: the Bank increased its discount rate upon losing reserves but failed to 
reduce it upon gaining them. In the contemporary literature this phenomenon is referred to as 
Bacon’s (1991) “rockets-and-feathers hypothesis”. Bacon argued that gasoline prices “shoot up 
like rockets” in response to a positive rise in oil prices and “float down like feathers” in response 
to a fall. Inter alia, Hannan and Berger (1991) and Neumark and Sharpe (1992) are among earlier 
studies that have tested the “rockets and feathers hypothesis” in the context of the banking 
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industry. Neumark and Sharpe (1992) found that consumer deposit interest rates respond more 
slowly to positive than negative changes in the market interest rates.  
In this paper we examine two specific issues. First, in overall terms, do standard-variable 
mortgage rates respond asymmetrically to changes in the RBA’s cash rate? If the cash rate 
changes, will Bacon’s (1991) “rockets-and-feathers hypothesis” be applicable in the context of 
Australia’s mortgage rates? Second, when the cash rate increases by 1 per cent, how much and 
how quickly does the standard-variable rate rise? If there exists a significant degree of 
asymmetric rate adjustments, one may then argue that financial institutions are profiting from the 
RBA rate changes. The second issue is of immense interest in the light of publicly held beliefs 
regarding increasing bank profits. Liu, Margaritis and Tourani-Rad (2011) argued that banks in 
Australia and New Zealand are very slow to pass on reductions in official interest rates and/or 
cost of funds to borrowers and they are profiting at the expense of their customers. 
The cash rate is not the only factor that affects lenders’ behaviour. The response of 
individual lenders to changes in their funding cost is also influenced by a number of other factors 
such as the extent of securitisation and individual bank exposures to external sources.
1
 However, 
the cash rate has become increasingly politicised and is the focus of much attention by media 
commentators. This is not hard to understand as for many families, mortgage payments constitute 
a substantial part of their income and interest rate changes have a direct and appreciable effect on 
their consumption. When the RBA lowers the cash rate, the media tends to focus on which 
lenders reduce their rates more quickly and how much of the change is passed onto borrowers.
2
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 Maudos and Fernandez de Guevara (2004, p.2277) examined the interest margin in the banking sectors of five 
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Politicians of all persuasions in Australia have also advised banks (particularly the “Big 4”) 
against increasing mortgage rates by more than increases in the RBA’s cash rate.
3
 For example, 
in December 2009, three of Australia’s four largest banks caused outrage by raising rates more 
than the RBA’s rate rise, while in February 2010 former Prime Minister, Kevin Rudd, urged 
banks to follow a decision by the National Australia Bank to keep interest-rate adjustments in 
alignment with any official rate rise.
4
 Banks have responded in a variety of ways, with some 
justifying rate rises in excess of those of the RBA’s cash rate based on the increased cost of 
funding while others have taken advantage of rate rises to increase their market share.
5
 It should 
be noted that this is not a new issue (see Gittins, 1991).  
The asymmetric pass through of funding costs into mortgage interest rates is by no means 
Australia specific. Other developed countries face the same dilemma. Corvoisier and Gropp 
(2002) and Bikker and Haaf (2002) have highlighted substantial differences across European 
countries in terms of the pass through of monetary policy interest rate changes into money market 
rates. Bikker and Haaf examined banking-sector competition in 23 countries and discovered that 
competition is much weaker in local markets. Using the Dutch data, both Toolsema and Jacobs 
(2007) and de Haan and Sterken (2011) found that there is asymmetric pass through of funding 
costs into mortgage-interest rates as banks tend to raise interest rates immediately once costs rise, 
while hesitating to lower their rates when costs drop. Their pass-through parameter was estimated 
to be around half of the Euro-zone average (de Haan and Sterken, 2011).  
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 ABC Radio, ‘PM plays down bank rate rise chances,’ 26 October 2007: 
http://www.digradio.com.au/news/stories/2007/10/26/2071270ABC.htm, ABC Radio, ‘Costello warns banks against 
rates rises,’ 23 October 2007:  http://www.abc.net.au/news/stories/2007/10 
/23/2068276.htm (both accessed 7 November 2011). 
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There are numerous studies in the literature which found evidence of asymmetric pass 
through in the mortgage market (e.g. Allen, Rutherford, and Wiley, 1999; Haney, 1988; Hofmann 
and Mizen, 2004; de Haan and Sterken, 2011). Hofman and Mizen (2004) observed downward 
rigidity of the mortgage interest rate in the UK, the US and Dutch markets. Payne and Waters 
(2008) also found that the response of the prime rate to changes in the federal funds rate in the 
US was asymmetric. By adopting the methodology proposed by Enders and Siklos (2001), Payne 
(2007, 2006) provided convincing evidence that US mortgage rates were cointegrated with the 
federal funds rate in the long run but with incomplete short-run pass through. Other international 
evidence on incomplete pass through exists for New Zealand retail rates (Liu et al., 2008); 
Canadian mortgage rates (Allen and McVanel, 2009) and the US online mortgage rates 
(Arbatskaya and Baye, 2004). 
Lim (2001) examined the asymmetric adjustments between three different types of interest 
rates in Australia: a bank bill rate, a loan rate and a deposit rate. She uses a multivariate 
asymmetric error-correction model to capture the long- and short-run relationships between the 
levels of the rates and short-run relationships between the changes in the rates. Her empirical 
results indicate that “banks value their borrowing customers and tend to pass on decreases in the 
loan rates faster than they pass on increases” (Lim, 2001, p.146). 
In a recent article Karamujic (2011) used monthly data (June 1994–March 2004) to examine 
the nature of seasonality in the mortgage interest rates of two major banks in Australia (i.e. 
National Australia Bank and Commonwealth Bank of Australia). By adopting a structural time 
series modelling approach, he finds evidence of significant seasonal variations in the standard-
variable mortgage rates in May, June, November, December and January. He concludes that “the 
observed seasonalities are not related to the bank’s intervention and can be attributed to the 
particular stage of the interest rate cycle” (Karamujic, 2011, p.337).
6
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 Some of these seasonal variations in the data have been captured in this study by the AR(1), AR(6) and AR(9) 
terms in Table 2. 
 5 
This paper offers an analytical modelling framework to quantify and assess the “rocket-and-
feathers hypothesis”. The results increase our understanding of the mortgage lending market in 
Australia. By testing two different types of possible asymmetries (i.e. the amount asymmetry and 
adjustment asymmetry), in this paper we address an important policy issue not recently tackled in 
the Australian context. To the best of our knowledge, only three overseas studies have 
incorporated both the amount and adjustment asymmetries in their short-run dynamic models for 
mortgage rates: (1) Allen and McVanel (2009) in their study of the Canadian mortgage market; 
(2) de Haan and Sterken (2011) in their work on the daily interest rate adjustment in the Dutch 
mortgage market; and (3) Liu, Margaritis and Tourani-Rad (2011) in their aggregate analysis of 
the interplay between the six-month deposit rate and two retail interest rates (the standard-
variable mortgage rate and the business lending rate) in New Zealand. The majority of previous 
studies have only tested for the adjustment asymmetry (see for example Sarno and Thornton, 
2003; Chong et al., 2006; Liu et al. 2008; Chong, 2010).  
The rest of this paper is structured as follows. In Section II our threshold and asymmetric 
error-correction models are briefly presented. Section III discusses the choice of our sample 
period and presents the normality and unit-root test results. Section IV presents the empirical 
results of the short- and long-run mortgage rate models and finally Section V provides some 
concluding remarks. 
II  Theoretical Framework 
The cash rate is the baseline for rates charged by Australian financial institutions for their 
various loans including mortgage rates. Based on a relationship between the cash rate (rt) and the 
mortgage rate (it) in the long run we assume that t t ti rβ ε= + . In this equation β  denotes the long-
run pass-through parameter, and tε  is the residual term. In the case where it and rt are 
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cointegrated an ECM version of this relationship, with thresholds for positive or negative 
deviations from the long run relationship, can be specified. 
In this paper two short-run dynamic models are estimated: in the first model (equation 1) the 
threshold parameter is zero (or 0τ = ) and in the second model (equation 2) this parameter is data-
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ω + , ω − , θ +  and θ −  are the error correction parameters, which are expected to be negative, 
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are the short-run effects of positive and negative changes in the cash 
rate on the mortgage rate at time t-s (where s can range between 0 and 12), respectively. This 
choice of lags allows for potential seasonality effects. The superscripts + and – denote the 
positive part and negative part of the time series, respectively as defined below. 
}{ ,0  if 0 and 0 if 0t t t t t t tr max r r r r r r+ + + +∆ = ∆ ⇒ ∆ = ∆ ∆ > ∆ = ∆ ≤     (3) 
}{ ,0  if 0 and 0 if 0t t t t t t tr min r r r r r r− − − −∆ = ∆ ⇒ ∆ = ∆ ∆ ≤ ∆ = ∆ >     (4) 
Equations (1) and (2) capture any possible short- or long-run asymmetric effects of changes in the 
cash rate on the mortgage rate. This is the first Australian study in which both the 
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amount ( , )s sλ λ
− +
and adjustment (or [ , , )]θ θω ω − +− + asymmetry coefficients have been incorporated 
in a short-run dynamic model for mortgage rates. 





on whether changes in tr are positive or negative. This means the short-run effects of rate rises 
on the mortgage rate are allowed to be different from those of rate cuts. Unlike the asymmetric 
model formulated in equation (1), in the threshold model (equation 2), the parameterτ is assumed 
to be different from zero. Once the resulting residuals have been sorted in ascending or 
descending order, we conduct a grid search within the middle 85 per cent of the observations and 
select an optimum value of the threshold, which yields the lowest residual sum of squares.  
Using equations (1) and (2), a Wald test can be employed to test the above two types of 
asymmetries. First, if the null hypothesis s sλ λ
+ −= (for all s values) is rejected, then positive and 
negative short-run changes in the cash rate have asymmetric effects on mortgage interest rates. 
Accordingly, if s sλ λ
+ −> , then in the short-run lenders pass on market-interest rate rises more than 
market-interest rate decreases. This phenomenon is referred to as the amount asymmetry.  
Second, if the null hypotheses ω ω+ −=  or θ θ+ −= are rejected, one can argue that the 
adjustment process towards the long-run equilibrium is also asymmetric and hence there is 
evidence of adjustment asymmetry. If ω ω− +> or θ θ− +> , then a lagged negative 
disequilibrium between the actual interest rate and its equilibrium path results in a relatively swift 
error correction as compared to the case of a lagged positive disequilibrium. This is consistent 
with financial institutions preferring to increase the mortgage rate to its long-run path when 
1 0tECM − <  or 1tECM τ− < , but having less desire to lower their rate to its equilibrium path, thus 
causing the speed of adjustment to be more sluggish or sometimes non-existent. This means that 
in the case of adjustment asymmetry either ω ω− +>  or θ θ− +> , depending on whether 
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equation (1) or equation (2) is being used in the testing procedure. For a detailed discussion of the 
distinction between the amount and adjustment asymmetries in the literature see Chen et al, 
(2005), Bachmeier and Griffin (2003) and Bettendorf et al (2009) in the context of petrol prices; 
Allen and McVanel (2009) and de Haan and Sterken (2011) in the context of mortgage rates.  
III  Data 
(i)  Choice of the Sample Period 1989–2011 
Since 1989, the RBA has conducted monetary policy by setting the desired interest rate on 
overnight loans in the money market (Grenville, 1990). This year is the starting point for our 
sample period (April 1989–October 2011). Figure 1 suggests that there is a very close 
relationship between the cash rate and the standard-variable mortgage rate. We use monthly data 
as lower frequencies have been found to obscure asymmetries (see Brannas and Ohlsson, 1999). 
[FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE] 
(ii)  Normality and Unit Root Test Results 
Based on the reported Jarque-Bera statistic in Table 1, the null hypothesis of normality is 
rejected at any conventional level for all series as their distributions are positively skewed and 
show a typical leptokurtic pattern with the kurtosis statistic exceeding well above 3.0. The 
augmented Dickey-Fuller (1981) and Kwiatkowski-Phillips-Schmidt-Shin (KPSS, 1992) test 
results have been presented in Table 1. In this paper the lowest value of the Schwarz criterion 
(SC) has been used as a guide to determine the optimal lag length. In Table 1 we have also 
reported the results of the Lee and Strazicich (2003) test, which endogenously incorporates two 
structural breaks in the testing procedure. The resulting two break dates for rt and it are shown in 
Figure 1 by the vertical dotted lines and solid lines, respectively. Irrespective of which test is 
considered, it appears that both rt and it contain a unit root and the residuals obtained from 
 9 
t t ti rβ ε= +  are stationary.
7
 Hence, one can argue that rt and it are cointegrated and this is easily 
backed up by the visual inspection of the graph presented in Figure 1. Lowe (1995) also found 
similar results based on his sample period which ran from January 1986 to October 1994. 
[TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE] 
IV  Empirical Results 
A cursory look at Figure 1 reveals that during the entire sample period 1989–2011 there are 
four specific periods when both the mortgage rate and the cash rate witnessed a noticeable 
downward trend: January 1990–July 1994 (as a result of a recession), May 1996–January 2000 
(as an outcome of the Asian financial crisis), January 2001–April 2002 (due to another recession) 
and September 2008–August 2009 (as a consequence of the recent global financial crisis). As can 
be seen from Figure 1, while the cash rate was on a downward trajectory during these periods, the 
reduction in the mortgage rate was not of the same magnitude over time. As a result, the gap 
between these two rates became wider when both rates were decreasing. This phenomenon is 
more noticeable in the first (January 1990–July 1994) and the last periods (September 2008–
August 2009). Such behaviour was not exhibited at times when the cash rate was on the rise. 
Attention is now directed to examine such an asymmetric behaviour using a more formal 
econometric approach.  
(i) Estimated Threshold Error-Correction Models 
In this section, we estimate the long-run relationship between the standard-variable mortgage rate 
and the cash rate by OLS. With 2 =0.637,R  the resulting residuals from our estimated 
relationship, 1.252t ti r= , appear to be stationary (ADF=-4.316). Thus, 1 1 11.252t t tECM i r− − −= − can 
                                                 
7
 The non-stationarity of interest rates has important implications for macroeconomic modelling at both the 
theoretical and the empirical levels. If interest rates contain unit roots, a one-time shock to interest rates will have 
permanent effects through time. On the other hand, if interest rates are stationary, then innovations are of transitory 
nature and reversible. The presence of a unit root in the nominal interest rates is found in many studies in the 
literature. However, DeJong et al. (1992) argue that this non-stationarity can be attributed to small samples and the 
well-known low power of unit root tests, which cannot distinguish between an I(1) and a near unit-root process. 
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be used as an error correction mechanism in a short-run dynamic model. The long-run pass- 
through parameter is estimated at 1.252, which is statistically significant at the 1 per cent level 
with a correct sign. This means that in the long run a 1 per cent rise in the cash rate by the RBA 
leads to a 1.252 per cent increase in the mortgage rate. We also tested the hypothesis that the 
long-run pass through parameter is equal to 1. Given F(1,270)=305 and p-value=0.00, such a 
hypothesis is rejected. Before using OLS, we also conducted the Hausman (1978) test in the 
following two stages to ensure that there is no simultaneity between the mortgage rate (it) and the 
cash rate (rt). First, we regressed rt on our selected instrumental variables (i.e. it-1, it-2, rt-1 and rt-2) 
and then the fitted values (i.e. t̂r ) and the resulting residuals (i.e. t̂e ) were obtained. Second, it was 
regressed on the estimated t̂r  and t̂e . Since the coefficient for t̂e  (-0.113) was not statistically 
significant (p-value=0.67), it was concluded that the cash rate was weakly exogenous with 
respect to the dependent variable. 
As discussed in the previous section, we have adopted two dynamic error-correction models 
(i.e. equations 1 and 2). In the first short-run dynamic model (Model I) the threshold parameter 
(τ ) was assumed zero. However, in Model II, which is based on equation (2), this parameter is 
determined endogenously by the data. In other words, after sorting the resulting residuals, we 
searched within the middle 85 per cent of the observations and selected a value of the threshold 
which yielded the lowest residual sum of squares as an estimate of the optimal threshold. The 
lower and upper values in our grid search were 0.2262 and 1.9194, respectively, with an 
increment of 0.01 at each step leading to an optimal threshold value of 0.2462. 
In terms of determining the optimal lag length (q) in equations (1) and (2), given that we are 
using monthly data, an upper band of 12 lags was allowed. Following the general-to-specific 
methodology, insignificant variables in equations (1) and (2) were omitted on the basis of a 
battery of maximum likelihood tests. We imposed joint-zero restrictions on explanatory variables 
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in the unrestricted (general) model to obtain the most parsimonious and robust equation. The 
estimation results for both Model I and Model II have been presented in Table 2.  
[TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE] 
According to Table 2, all of the estimated coefficients are statistically significant at the 1 per 




− . Both 
models also perform well in terms of goodness-of-fit statistics. The adjusted R
2
 is as high as 0.64 
and the overall F test rejects the null hypothesis at the 1 per cent level of significance. 
Furthermore, both estimated models pass a battery of diagnostic tests and show no sign of serial 
correlation (see the Breusch-Godfrey LM tests), misspecification (see the Ramsey RESET test), 
heteroskedasticity (see the ARCH tests) or instability (see the Chow forecast tests in three 
different out of sample periods). The only diagnostic test that our models could not pass was the 
Jarque-Bera normality test of the residuals. One should not be concerned about the normality test 
results as we have used a large sample size with 261 monthly observations.
8
 The estimated 
coefficients of AR(1), AR(6) and AR(9) are also statistically significant. This indicates the 
presence of some seasonality as also found by Karamujic (2011). The corresponding inverse roots 
of AR polynomials for both models are well within the unit circle. As can be seen from Table 2, 
the estimated coefficients in both Models I and II are very similar in terms of their magnitudes 
and statistical significance. 
Ceteris paribus, if in the short run the cash rate increased, say by 1 per cent in a particular 
month, this would have immediately led to a rise of 1.158 per cent in the mortgage rate. On the 
other hand, a similar 1 per cent rate cut would have resulted in only 0.550 per cent instantaneous 
fall followed by a subsequent 0.290 per cent cut a month later. The total short-run effect 
associated with the RBA’s rate cut would then be only 0.84 per cent (0.55+0.29), whereas the 
                                                 
8
 Although the Jarque-Berra statistic rejects the normality of the errors, the reported F statistics are asymptotically 
justified as the method of moments’ diagnostic tests. See Hayashi (2000, sections 2.7 and 2.10). 
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corresponding effect for a rate rise would be 1.158 per cent. This proffers support for the short-
run applicability of the “rockets-and-feathers hypothesis” in the context of the mortgage market 
in Australia. 
What about the adjustment asymmetry? In Table 2 ω ω− +>  and θ θ− +> , it is thus clear 







the mortgage rate quickly adjusts towards its equilibrium with an estimated feedback coefficient 







> , such an adjustment does not take place as the corresponding t ratio for the feedback 





 in Table 2). It appears that 
the Australian mortgage lenders charge above equilibrium rates when such a deviation from the 
equilibrium path occurs. Conversely, when their actual rates are below the market equilibrium 
(i.e. Model I) or less than a certain threshold (i.e. Model II where 0.2462τ = ), they correct the 
prevailing gap by raising their mortgage rates with a feedback coefficient of -0.17. 
We have also formally tested the absence of both the amount asymmetry (i.e. the short-run 
asymmetry) and the adjustment asymmetry (i.e. the long-run asymmetry) using a Wald test with 
the results presented in Table 3. The null hypotheses are rejected at the 1 per cent level of 
significance, irrespective of which model has been used in the testing procedure. Based on these 
results, one can argue that there is convincing evidence for the existence of both amount 
asymmetry and adjustment asymmetry. Our results are also consistent with previous studies. An 
overwhelming majority of previous studies suggest that there is a great deal of asymmetry in the 
short-run changes in mortgage rates. See for instance Heffernan (1997), Payne (2007, 2006), 
Toolsema and Jacobs (2007), Saadon, et al. (2008), Liu, et al. (2008), Allen and McVanel (2009) 
and de Haan and Sterken (2011).  
[TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE] 
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What can possibly explain this phenomenon? In general, Peltzman (2000) believed that 
various measures of imperfect competition, the existence of consumer search costs, inventory 
cost, inflation-related asymmetric menu costs, and input price volatility, determine the extent of 
asymmetric changes in the prices of goods and services. Since interest rates represent the price of 
borrowed or loaned funds, one can relate to Peltzman’s findings with a slightly different 
perspective regarding changes in interest rates. Previous interest rate studies have identified five 
explanations for the rigidity in the rate adjustment process: fixed menu cost, high switching cost, 
imperfect competition, asymmetric information, and interest rate regulation (see inter alia 
Hannan and Berger, 1991; Scholnick, 1996; Chong et al., 2006; and Chong, 2010). 
In the context of Australian mortgage rates, Lowe and Rohling (1992) provided a detailed 
account of the stickiness of various types of loan rates. They argued that the two most important 
explanations for the downward stickiness of the mortgage rates in Australia are switching costs 
and risk sharing. Switching costs (such as loan establishment fees, stamp duty, early repayment 
fees) associated with moving from one housing loan to another could be quite high. It is also 
argued that “if borrowers are more risk averse than the shareholders of the bank, there exists an 
implicit risk insurance argument for the stickiness of interest rates” (Lowe and Rohling, 1992, 
p.11). If competition is not strong and customers’ decisions are interest-rate inelastic, then 
changes in the cash rate may have relatively little impact on mortgage rates.  
V  Conclusion 
Banks’ asymmetric behaviour in setting mortgage rates is a cause of concern in the 
community. As in many other countries, mortgage interest payments constitute a significant 
proportion of consumer spending in Australia. However, little empirical work has been conducted 
regarding the dynamic effects of a change in the cash rate on Australia’s retail mortgage rate. 
This paper quantifies the extent of asymmetric behaviour exhibited by the banking industry as a 
whole by tracing out the dynamic asymmetric responses of lenders to changes in the cash rate 
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over time. Specifically, this paper tests the “rockets-and-feathers hypothesis” in the Australian 
residential mortgage market. The framework can be adapted to model the asymmetries in other 
types of retail and wholesale interest rates, including those for credit cards, personal loans, and 
business loans. 
Using monthly data from 1989 to 2011, we found that rate rises are passed onto the 
consumer faster than rate cuts. The short-run effects of a 1 per cent rise and fall in the cash rate 
on the mortgage rate are 1.158 per cent (occurred almost instantaneously) and 0.84 per cent 
(eventuated within 1–2 months), respectively. In sum, one can conclude that when actual 
mortgage rates are below the market equilibrium value, Australian banks quickly fill the gap by 
raising their mortgage rates. Conversely, when actual mortgage rates are above the equilibrium 
path, lenders usually hesitate to lower their rates. 
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FIGURE 1 











































































































































Note: The endogenously-determined two break dates for rt and it are shown by the vertical 
dotted lines and solid lines, respectively. 
 


















Skewness 1.62 -1.06 2.33 -1.69 -1.976 
Kurtosis 4.88 9.42 7.96 8.30 9.051 
Jarque-Bera 159* 517* 523* 446* 590* 
ADF test:      
   t stat. -2.576 -8.315* -2.426 -6.854* -4.316* 
   Optimal lag 4 1 2 1 4 
KPSS:      
   LM stat. 0.400* 0.041 0.274* 0.095 0.119 
   Bandwidth 12 9 12 10 12 
Lee and Strazicich LMτ  test:      
   t ratio -2.950 -7.281* -2.693 -6.856* -6.617* 
   Optimal lag 6 6 6 1 8 













Notes: (1) * indicates that the corresponding null hypothesis is rejected at 1 per cent level of 
significance. (2) The choice between the crash model and the trend break model in the Lee and 
Strazicich (2003) test was based on the statistical significance of the corresponding parameters.  
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TABLE 2 




(Equation 2) Variable 
Coefficient t ratio p-value Coefficient t ratio p-value 




























-0.656* -5.7 0.00 -0.653* -5.7 0.00 
AR(1) -0.319* -5.4 0.00 -0.317* -5.3 0.00 
AR(6) 0.218* 4.1 0.00 0.220* 4.1 0.00 
AR(9) 0.130* 2.8 0.00 0.131* 2.9 0.00 
Goodness of fit statistics:       
  
2
R  0.657   0.659   
  
2
R  0.645   0.647   
Overall F(7, 251) 53.5* 0.00  53.9*  0.00 
Akaike info criterion -1.045   -1.050   
Schwarz criterion -0.908   -0.913   
Hannan-Quinn criterion -0.990   -0.995   
       
Diagnostic tests       
 DW 1.932   1.932   
 Serial correlation LM Test:       
     2 lags 1.455  0.24 1.225  0.30 
     4 lags: F(4,247) 1.523  0.20 1.359  0.25 
     6 lags: F(6,245) 1.520  0.17 1.363  0.23 
     8 lags: F(8,243) 1.563  0.14 1.455  0.17 
    10 lags: F(10, 241) 1.280  0.24 1.191  0.30 
  Ramsey RESET: F(1,250) 1.695  0.19 2.257  0.13 
  Jarque-Bera: (2)χ  535.9*  0.00 528.4*  0.00 
 Heteroskedasticity ARCH test:       
    1 lag: F(1,259) 1.892  0.17 2.043  0.15 
    2 lags: F(2,258) 1.400  0.25 1.450  0.24 
    3 lags: F(3,257) 1.284  0.28 1.233  0.30 
    4 lags: F(4,256) 1.255  0.29 1.168  0.33 
 Chow forecast test:       
   2007M01-2011M10:  F(58,193) 0.774  0.87 0.806  0.83 
   2008M01-2011M10:   F(46,205) 1.026  0.44 1.040  0.41 
   2009M01-2011M10:   F(34,217) 0.651  0.93 0.661  0.93 
Notes:  (1) * indicates that the corresponding null hypothesis is rejected at 1 per cent level of significance. (2) 
EViews and WinRats software packages have been used in generating our results.  
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TABLE 3 
Test Results For Amount and Adjustment Asymmetries 
Model I Model II 
Null hypothesis 
F statistics p-value F statistics p-value 
Amount asymmetry:     
0 0λ λ
+ −=  F=(1,251)=33.04 0.00 F=(1,251)=32.74 0.00 
0 0 1λ λ λ
+ − −= +  F=(1,251)=8.99 0.00 F=(1, 251)=8.77 0.00 
Adjustment asymmetry:     
ω ω+ −=  F=(1,251)=33.23 0.00 — — 
θ θ+ −=  — — F=(1,251)=33.23  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
